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“AN OBJEC T LESSON TO THE COUNTRY”
The 1915 Atlantic Fleet Summer Exercise and the U.S. Navy on the
Eve of World War I
Ryan Peeks

O

n 26 May 1915, the Washington Post warned its readers that an invading
force had “established a base, and landed troops on the shore of Chesapeake
Bay,” in preparation for a march on Washington. The cause of this invasion? Defeat of the U.S. Navy’s Atlantic Fleet by “a foreign foe of superior naval strength.”1
Over the course of several days, the enemy fleet had made its way across the
Atlantic and destroyed the American scouting line. The American commander,
Admiral Frank Friday Fletcher, was convinced that its target was New England
and let the enemy fleet slip unmolested into the Chesapeake with a twentythousand-man invading force, the vanguard of another hundred thousand
soldiers en route from Europe.2 Shortcomings in the quantity and quality of the
Atlantic Fleet’s scouting force had rendered its seventeen battleships irrelevant.3
Fortunately for the capital, this enemy fleet and invasion army were imaginary, part of the Atlantic Fleet’s summer exercise. They were, however, the
culmination of a very real campaign to embarrass the Secretary of the Navy,
Josephus Daniels, and force a naval expansion program onto the heretofore
skeptical Wilson administration. The leader of this campaign, the outgoing
Aide for Operations, Rear Admiral Bradley Fiske, designed the exercises for
4
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Although the scenario for the invasion was almost certainly beyond the logistical capacity of the German fleet—lacking, as it did, any bases in the western
Atlantic—the maneuvers were not merely an exercise in spite by a disgruntled
admiral keen on embarrassing his political masters. The U.S. Navy’s leadership
was greatly concerned about the German Empire’s High Seas Fleet and its (highly
exaggerated) potential to conduct aggressive action in the Western Hemisphere,
although the consensus believed its targets would be in the Caribbean or Latin
America rather than the Atlantic coast of the United States.5 The purely naval
portions of the scenario, especially the weakness of American scouting vessels,
reflected the contemporary concerns of the Navy’s strategic elite and their assumptions about the nature of naval warfare.
More than a mere historical curiosity, the full story of the Atlantic Fleet’s 1915
exercise illuminates three aspects of the U.S. Navy on the cusp of America’s entry
into the First World War. First, it allows us to examine an underexplored, but serious, rupture in civil-military relations as the Navy’s uniformed leadership sought
to undermine Secretary Daniels by working with opposition politicians. Second,
it reveals the Navy’s use of its German counterpart as both an administrative
model and a strategic threat. Finally, the episode allows us to see how the Navy’s
leadership assessed its force structure and readiness for war after two decades of
naval buildup.
Viewed through the lens of civil-military relations, these exercises were one
salvo in a long fight between Secretary Daniels and an influential cabal of disgruntled officers, led by Fiske, that lasted from Daniels’s installation in 1913
through a bruising set of charges laid against Daniels’s war record by Admiral
William S. Sims in 1920. Whatever the relative merit of their complaints, these
bureaucratic insurgents stretched the bounds of American civil-military relations
in their desire to rearrange the administration of the Department of the Navy to
reduce the authority of civilian officials and place control over naval operations
and policy in the hands of uniformed officers.
Fiske crossed clear boundaries of professional conduct in his effort to reform
the department. Alongside the 1915 exercises, Fiske was busy feeding embarrassing information to hostile elements of the press and pro-Navy Republicans such
as Representative Augustus P. Gardner of Massachusetts and Senator George
Clement Perkins of California. Here, Fiske was joined by Daniels’s assistant secretary, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who colluded with the secretary’s “bitterest personal enemies in active ways that [could] have led to his dismissal.”6 The exercises themselves were catnip for the heterogeneous, though mostly Republican,
collection of pressure groups that wanted the Wilson administration to increase
military manpower and spending in response to the Great War.
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The exercises also highlight the Navy’s peculiar fascination with Germany as
both an enemy and administrative model.7 From about 1900, the Navy viewed
the German Empire as a likely threat, imagining its expansion into the Caribbean
or South America as the flash point. A 1903 scenario developed at the Naval War
College even suggested that German shooting clubs in Brazil represented a potential fifth column intent on destabilizing that country.8 Successive iterations of
the Navy’s Plan BLACK for war against Germany assumed that the Atlantic Fleet
would have to stop the High Seas Fleet from capturing an intermediate base in
the Caribbean Sea on the way to carving out colonies in Latin America.9Although
fanciful, this scenario was one of the key measuring sticks that USN officers used
to judge the capabilities of their fleet.10
Even as they were inflating the threat from the High Seas Fleet, some American officers looked to the German navy’s administrative structure as a model
to emulate, chiefly its strong general staff and lack of effective civilian control.11
From 1900, the U.S. Navy possessed an advisory General Board, led by Admiral of the Navy George Dewey, the hero of the Spanish-American War, and supported by a small number of personal aides.12 Along with answering questions
from the secretary on topics spanning the breadth of Navy business, the board
generally submitted to him yearly recommendations on a construction plan to
propose to Congress, and supervised the production of rudimentary war plans.
Although Dewey, the senior officer in the Navy, maintained that his board adequately served the functions of a German-style general staff, Fiske and his cabal
disagreed.13 Instead of the weak General Board, these reformers desired an independent naval staff only nominally responsible to the secretary.
Finally, this episode allows us to see how the Navy’s uniformed leadership assessed its force structure and advocated for greater resources. It is true that most
elements of the Navy’s strategic apparatus, including the General Board and the
Naval War College, viewed a strong battle line as the most important determinant
of naval strength. By mid-1915, however, many influential officers, among them
Fiske and Sims, were sounding the alarm about the Navy’s lack of small scout
cruisers and large, fast battle cruisers. These fears, incubated at the College, were
heightened in the wake of an unsuccessful—and unpublicized—set of exercises
earlier that year.
It was no accident, then, that the summer exercise in 1915 prominently featured an inadequate scouting line. Fiske intended to sound the alarm about the
parlous state of the Navy’s cruisers. A decade had passed since the U.S. Navy
last received funding for new cruisers, as the General Board and successive Navy
secretaries declined to support cruiser construction over battleships in front of
Congress. The Navy possessed only three modern scout cruisers, ordered as an
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experiment in the 1904 budget. Beyond those, scouting was tasked to older armored cruisers and a grab bag of superannuated protected cruisers entirely unsuited for modern combat. Fiske’s intention was not just to embarrass Daniels but
to highlight what he saw as the path forward by creating the political preconditions for the secretary and Congress to increase naval funding.
The force structure gaps highlighted by the 1915 exercises successfully informed the landmark 1916 Naval Expansion Act, which provided for an unprecedented construction program, one that included ten battleships and, critically, six
battle cruisers and ten smaller cruisers to improve the Navy’s scouting capability.
Not only did the exercises play a role in convincing the Wilson administration to
support a large construction program in the first place, but a close examination
of the record shows that the composition of the bill itself reflected the force structure gaps that the exercises were designed to evince.
Despite this programmatic importance, the 1915 Atlantic Fleet summer exercises have often been discussed in the historical literature only as a spiteful
gesture by Fiske, who was facing retirement after Daniels selected the relatively
unknown Captain William S. Benson to serve as the first Chief of Naval Operations, which replaced the Aide for Operations position that Fiske held.14 This
article argues that the form of Fiske’s challenge to the secretary is important as
well. Although Fiske was their animating spirit, the Atlantic Fleet’s 1915 summer
exercises reflected a consensus view among the service’s leadership that the Navy
lacked the right mix of ships for modern warfare.
THE NEW NAVY’S MISSING SCOUTS
The roots of the force structure issues exposed in 1915 lay in the birth of the “New
Navy” in the late nineteenth century. In the late 1880s and early 1890s, a group of
naval officers, many connected with the then-new Naval War College, convinced
Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy that the United States needed a fleet of
oceangoing battleships to ensure its security. In 1890, Tracy convinced Congress
to authorize three battleships.15 These officers, including Captain Alfred Thayer
Mahan and Commodore Stephen B. Luce, may have been too successful; as Robert
Greenhalgh Albion has noted, battleships dominated congressional discussion of
naval appropriations for decades after 1890, making it “difficult to get enough of
the lesser types of ships [through Congress] to form a well-balanced Fleet.”16
Theoretically, the Navy’s uniformed leadership understood the importance of
cruisers to a modern fleet. In 1903, Secretary William Moody asked the General
Board to lay out force structure goals. Its response, General Board Memorandum No. 420, remained at the heart of the board’s construction “wish list” for
years to come. The document laid out a seventeen-year plan for building a gargantuan fleet of forty-eight battleships, supported by twenty-four large armored
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cruisers, ninety-six smaller cruisers, and forty-eight destroyers.17 While the
board’s vision stood no chance of full congressional funding and was, perhaps,
beyond the country’s ability to build, it was a blueprint for a well-balanced fleet of
varied ship classes serving complementary roles.
As it soon became obvious that there was no congressional appetite for the
entire 1903 fleet plan (table 1), the board made it clear that it was only willing to
request cruisers if Congress built battleships at a rate to sustain the goal of having
forty-eight battleships by 1920, rather than bending to political reality and making plans for a smaller, balanced fleet with appropriate numbers of other classes.18
This was in keeping with the belief, widespread in the Navy, that battleships were
the only determinant of naval strength that mattered.
The board’s approach highlights one of the less appealing aspects of the Navy’s
uniformed leadership in the early twentieth century: its unwillingness to modify
its “professional” advice in the face of reality. Rather than acknowledging that
its forty-eight-battleship fleet was politically impossible, the board continued to
insist on the original plan.19 At other times, the board urged preparation for war
with powers (such as imperial Germany) that American political leaders had no
intention of fighting. While this fit with the officer corps’s self-identification as a
disinterested “naval aristocracy” providing expert (if not always realistic) advice
to politicians, it also suggested a certain contempt for the roles of Congress and
the secretary in setting naval budgets and policy.20 Fiske’s actions in the Wilson
administration, although extreme, fit neatly into this worldview.
At any rate, while the General Board nearly always recommended cruiser construction, it undercut those recommendations by classifying them as secondary
to “the purely distinctive fighting ships of the navy—battleships, destroyers, and
submarines”—in its construction requests, leading successive secretaries to strip
cruisers out of the construction programs forwarded to Congress.21 As shown in
table 1, not a year passed without the secretary requesting, and Congress providing, at least one battleship. While it certainly was possible for the board to ask
the secretary for cheaper scout cruisers at the expense of battleships—Daniels’s
1915 report put the cost of a new scout cruiser at $5 million, compared with $18.8
million for a battleship—it simply did not.22 In practice, this meant that the U.S.
Navy received no money for new cruiser construction after the Navy bill passed
in 1904, which provided funds for three experimental light scout cruisers (Chester, Birmingham, and Salem) and the Navy’s last two armored cruisers (North
Carolina and Montana).23
By the start of the First World War, the U.S. Navy was far behind its competitors in cruisers of all types. Not only did the British, German, and Japanese navies possess more scout cruisers, but all three had built large, fast, and powerful
battle cruisers, a class that was absent from the U.S. Navy’s force structure, in part
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TABLE 1
GENERAL BOARD PLANS VERSUS REALITY, 1904–14 BILLS
General
Board
Program
Cruisers

Year

SECNAV
Program

Cruisers
Authorized

General
Board
Program
Battleships

SECNAV
Program

Battleships
Authorized

1904

8 (1 armored,
3 protected, 4
scout)

6–8 (1 armored,
3 protected,
2–4 scout)

5 (2 armored, 3
scout)

2

1

1

1905

5 scouts

0

0

3

3

2

1906

3 scouts

2

0

3

2

1

1907

2 scouts

0

0

2

1–2

1

1908

4 scouts

4

0

4

4

2

1909

4 scouts

4

0

4

4

2

1910

4 scouts

0

0

4

2

2

1911

4 scouts

0

0

4

2

2

1912

4 scouts

0

0

4

2

1

1913

2 battle cruisers

0

0

4

3

1

1914

0

0

0

4

3

3

Sources: Tillman, Navy Yearbook, pp. 619–23; General Board to Secretary Daniels, “Ultimate Strength of the United States Navy,” [September] 1912 and
[December] 1914, General Board Subject File #420-2, RG 80, NARA I; Daniels, “[1915] Report of the Secretary of the Navy,” pp. 85–93.

because the General Board declined to request them prior to 1913.24 Up to 1912,
the General Board defended this lack of battle cruisers by defining them as a type
of battleship. The board’s earliest mention of battle cruisers, in October 1906,
categorized the British battle cruisers as “in reality battleships[—]armored ships
available for the battle line.”25 By 1910, it argued that battle cruisers were simply
“big gun armored cruisers,” and unnecessary for the United States so long as the
Navy had enough battleships “to force the enemy to place armored cruiser[s]” in
the battle line.26
In contrast, at the Naval War College, opinion increasingly held that battle
cruisers were integral to searching for enemy fleets and blinding their scouts.
Officers attending the College’s 1909 Summer Conference claimed that the battle
cruiser “is the only ship that can meet the qualifications of speed, endurance, size,
and fighting power” needed for effective scouting.27 Most American supporters
of battle cruisers made a similar argument, suggesting that battle cruisers were a
solution to the Navy’s scouting woes.
This stance was bolstered by at least some practical evidence from the fleet.
In mid-1910, the Secretary of the Navy solicited suggestions on future scouts
from the commanders of the Navy’s three Chester-class scout cruisers. Birmingham’s captain, Commander William B. Fletcher, responded that “the ideal scout
would be a vessel of the highest speed, together with large radius, capability of
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maintaining speed, and with battery and protection such as to [engage successfully] vessels of equal speeds.” In other words, a battle cruiser.28
In 1911, then-Captain William S. Sims, attending the first “Long Course” at
the College, revived the battle cruiser issue. Sims and his colleagues spent much
of their time studying the “Blue-Black” problem—a war between the United
States and Germany—and Sims highlighted scouting as the U.S. Navy’s major
deficiency demonstrated in war games. In a personal letter to a British contact,
Vice Admiral Henry B. Jackson, Sims noted that battle cruisers “will be necessary
to ensure the success” of scouting and screening in future conflicts, and criticized
his navy’s unwillingness to build the type, now that it had a sufficient number
of battleships.29 Further along in his course, while playing the role of a German
admiral in a Blue-Black war game, Sims observed that the American fleet “would
remain wholly in the dark as to our movements while crossing the ocean. . . .
[The German fleet] is vastly superior, both as to the number and power of [its]
scouting forces.”30
His conclusions impressed the College President, Captain William L. Rodgers, and in December 1911 he forwarded one of Sims’s reports on the matter to Secretary George von Lengerke Meyer.31 Meyer was interested in battle
cruisers, having already asked the Bureau of Construction and Repair to draft
potential battle cruiser designs in 1910.32 What is unclear, however, is the nature of that interest: Did Meyer regard them as part of the battle line, or as
scouts? Likewise, the General Board’s views remained in flux. In 1911, it made
a tepid request for battle cruisers “with a special view for service in the Pacific
Ocean,” but only if their construction did not interfere with the construction
of new battleships.33
In 1912, battle cruisers again were on the agenda at the College’s Summer Conference, with the General Board in attendance. Most attendees appear to have
been in favor of battle cruiser construction for the U.S. Navy, so long as that did
not interfere with battleship numbers.34 The available evidence suggests that their
time in Newport made an impression on the members of the General Board. Prior to the Summer Conference, a board subcommittee had drafted a building program that omitted “problematical” battle cruisers.35 Yet in its final report, written
after the conference, the full board claimed that “we must have [battle cruisers] to
hope for successful conflict. . . . These vessels have a military value not possible to
obtain from other types,” and strongly implied that such vessels were to be used
for scouting, screening, and other operations away from the battle line.36 Despite
this, Secretary Meyer left cruisers out of the Navy Department budget submitted
to Congress, which called merely for three battleships and twelve destroyers.37
Still, as the Wilson administration prepared to enter office, it was clear that
the Navy was warming up to the idea of spending serious money to remedy its
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scouting woes. However, the case had not been made sufficiently outside the
Navy to affect the secretary’s budget request or congressional appropriations, and
the new administration was more skeptical of naval spending than its Republican
predecessor.
FISKE AND DANIELS
Josephus Daniels, heretofore most prominent as a violently white-supremacist
newspaper publisher and Democratic Party power broker in North Carolina, was,
like most Navy Secretaries of his era, entirely new to naval affairs.38 Apart from
his marriage to the sister of Worth Bagley—one of the few USN officers killed
during the Spanish-American War—he had little connection to, or interest in,
the Navy.39 Daniels was, however, an absolutist on the subject of civilian control
of the military and intensely skeptical of senior naval leaders, whom he “saw as
part of a closed aristocracy” leading a “life of privilege.”40 This view was perhaps
exacerbated by the advice Meyer gave him to “keep the power to direct the Navy”
in the secretary’s office and to reject any measure that threatened it.41
Ironically, the main threat to Daniels’s power came from one of Meyer’s last
appointments, Rear Admiral Bradley A. Fiske, the Aide (sometimes spelled Aid)
for Operations since February 1913. Meyer created the position to provide independent advice, separate from the Navy’s administrative bureaus and the General
Board. Thus, soon after taking office in 1909, he created four “Aides”—for inspections, material, operations, and personnel—to advise him.42 These positions
rested on an uncertain foundation. Despite his best efforts, Meyer never received
congressional sanction for the aides. While Congress did not take action to disestablish the positions, it did not pass enabling legislation either, leaving them
dependent on the secretary’s forbearance.43
Daniels entered office in 1913 with Democrats controlling both houses of
Congress for the first time since the 1890s. Lacking experience with naval matters, Daniels took many of his personnel cues from congressional Democrats,
especially fellow southerners, who were, by and large, opposed to the aide system and naval expansion.44 Soon after taking office, Daniels removed the head of
the Bureau of Navigation (which was responsible for personnel matters), Captain
Philip Andrews, replacing him with Commander Victor Blue, who was elevated
over a host of senior officers.45 Although very junior for the position, Blue was
a fellow North Carolinian with whom Daniels had a preexisting relationship.46
Daniels also took steps to get rid of the aide system. In addition to Andrews, he
fired Captain Templin Potts, the Aide for Personnel, and then left the billet vacant.
Beyond Potts, Daniels intended to let the other aides serve out their terms before
letting the billets lapse. Even with those changes, at least one of Daniels’s political
allies felt that he had not gone far enough. In late April, Senator “Pitchfork Ben”
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Tillman (D-SC) warned him, “You are surrounded by a naval clique which is ever
on the watch to control your actions and movements and thoughts.”47
Prominent among this clique was the imperious Fiske, who surely represented
all that Daniels disliked about the Navy’s officer corps. An author, inventor, and
strategist of some renown, Fiske was one of the ablest officers of the age—and he
knew it. A man of strong views, Fiske had a history of intemperance in defending
them.48 By 1913, he maintained that the material and organizational underpinnings of the U.S. Navy were well behind those of its rivals, especially Germany,
and desired to change this situation through the creation of an independent naval
general staff.49 This was anathema to Daniels and, indeed, ran contrary to the
fundamentals of American civil-military relations. Previously, Fiske’s personal
respect for Meyer had acted as a check on his behavior, but he was barely able to
contain his contempt for Daniels, whom he viewed as an intellectual lightweight
focused on trivia at the expense of preparing the fleet for war.50
It is possible that this was Meyer’s intent in naming Fiske to the Aide for Operations post as one of his last acts as secretary.51 Even if he had been unaware of
the precise identity of his successor, the Democratic Party’s skeptical views on
naval affairs were a matter of public record.52 Furthermore, Meyer would have
been aware of Fiske’s views on administration either because his reputation preceded him or from his time on the General Board in 1910–11. Those views were,
of course, unacceptable to Daniels and most of the ascendant Democratic Party.
In his autobiography, Fiske claimed that “nine tenths [of military officers], except
those who come from the South, prefer to have the Republican party in power[,] . . .
the more patriotic of the two [parties], and . . . more favorably inclined toward an
adequate army and navy,” suggesting that Fiske found the new administration unacceptable himself, despite the theoretically apolitical nature of the Navy’s officer
corps.53 Indeed, throughout his tenure Daniels leaned on southern-born officers,
and his preference may have rested on more than simple sectional bias.
Fiske’s views on the needs of the service were shared passively by many naval
officers and actively by a relatively small, but influential, group of officers who
had spent time thinking and writing about naval strategy, professional development, and service organization. Many of these officers, such as William Sims,
Dudley Knox, and William Pratt, had spent time at the Naval War College, either
as students or staff. Since, in many ways, those at the early-twentieth-century
College acted as an ersatz, and formally powerless, general staff, they were acutely
aware of, and unhappy with, the lack of a “real” staff.54 What separated Fiske from
many like-minded officers was his willingness to violate professional norms to
put his views across. Amusingly, Sims worried that Fiske, “constitutionally opposed to conflict of any kind,” was unequal to the task of promoting naval reform
in Washington.55
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On the contrary, Fiske clashed immediately with the new Secretary of the
Navy. After a month under Daniels, Fiske was concerned that he would be forced
out after a major row over promotion policies.56 That summer, he took the opportunity of Daniels’s first visit to the Naval War College to argue in favor of
administrative reform (Fiske suggested superciliously that Daniels’s trip would be
enhanced if he could “prevail upon himself to come as a student”).57 There, Fiske
invited Daniels to dinner with a group of officers assigned to the College, along
with Sims, whom he specially invited to “help out” with the secretary. One of the
attendees, Captain Josiah McKean, suggested that Daniels abdicate some of his
military authority in favor of the Aide for Operations, a suggestion the secretary
immediately rejected.58 It is unclear whether Fiske put McKean up to it (although
it would have certainly been in Fiske’s character), but Daniels can be forgiven if he
developed a certain skepticism toward his Aide for Operations and Fiske’s circle
of reformers. Indeed, Daniels attempted to shift Fiske out of Washington—to run
the Naval War College—and was only stayed by an intervention from Dewey.59
Understandably, Daniels preferred to receive his professional advice from
other quarters. Despite Fiske’s pretentions, he was not the only conduit for information from the Navy to the secretary. In addition to the corporate General
Board (on which Fiske sat, but did not run), Daniels placed a great deal of trust in
Captain Albert G. Winterhalter, the Aide for Material, despite his concerns about
the aide system, and Blue, his handpicked chief of the Bureau of Navigation.60
Whatever Fiske claimed, Daniels was not lacking for professional naval advice.
Put bluntly, Fiske’s main objection was that his was not the professional advice
Daniels sought.
With the outbreak of war in the summer of 1914, Fiske’s concern about the
Navy’s administration took on a new urgency. The Aide for Operations worried
that Germany would win the war and then turn against the United States.61 In his
words, he saw “the German machine smashing its way across . . . France, crushing the comparatively improvised machines of England and France,” while his
country was “watching the spectacle as a child watches a fire spreading.” He was
especially concerned at Daniels’s seeming unwillingness to take action to prepare
for potential war, instead investing his time on “an elaborate system for educating
the enlisted men.”62
Fiske’s first suggestion concerned the disposition of the Atlantic Fleet, the
Navy’s primary battle fleet. The Aide for Operations, who had expressed admiration for the High Seas Fleet’s large-scale exercises, pushed Secretary Daniels to
concentrate the Atlantic Fleet in one anchorage in mid-August, including withdrawing several battleships from the Mexican coast, where they were supporting
the U.S. occupation of Veracruz (a deployment sparked, in part, by the delivery of
arms for the Mexican government aboard a German steamer).63 With the entire
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fleet in one place, it could then conduct large-scale target practice, drills, and exercises to better prepare itself for war. Daniels vetoed the suggestion.64
Similar suggestions on how to respond to the European war fell on deaf ears.
Undeterred, Fiske decided to put his views in writing, preparing what he called
“the most important” paper he had ever written on 9 November. In this memorandum to Daniels, Fiske laid out the case that the U.S. Navy was “unprepared”
for war on the grounds of material and personnel shortages, as well as organizational inefficiency. The greater part of Fiske’s note was taken up with a plea for a
general staff. Without an organization for developing war plans and overseeing
training, the U.S. Navy, he claimed, “shall be whipped if we ever are brought into
war with any one of the great naval powers of Europe or Asia.”65 Fiske also convinced the General Board to make a formal recommendation, on 11 November,
to Daniels regarding preparation for war and the need for more trained sailors
and officers. Daniels declined to act on these recommendations, correctly noting that the role of the General Board was to answer questions posed to it by the
secretary, not to offer unsolicited advice.66
Someone on the board, perhaps Fiske, leaked its 11 November recommendations to the press, where they became fodder for the nascent “preparedness”
movement.67 This heterodox movement, linking politicians with advocacy organizations such as the Navy League and those founded after the commencement
of war in Europe such as the National Security League, was split between those
who wanted the United States to enter the war and those who wanted the country
to defend itself from belligerent powers. Both wings, however, agreed that the
military needed bolstering immediately. Critically, partisan rancor strengthened
the preparedness movement. Mostly led by organizations and politicians from
the Republican Party and the remnants of Theodore Roosevelt’s Progressives, the
movement took a dim view of the Wilson administration.68
Evidently believing that the international situation made his advice more important than the chain of command, Fiske threw his lot in with the administration’s enemies—and manufactured a civil-military relations crisis. Here, he was
aided by Daniels’s assistant secretary, Franklin D. Roosevelt, who also supported
enlarging the fleet. In October, both men met with Massachusetts congressman
Augustus P. Gardner, “Daniels’s most vehement critic in the House,” and fed him
detailed information on the gap between Daniels’s shipbuilding requests and the
programs suggested by the General Board.69 That same month, Fiske also met
with California senator George Clement Perkins, another Republican; passed information to the New York Herald; and ghostwrote a column in the Army and
Navy Journal.70
By this point, Fiske’s activities already were well beyond established norms of
behavior for the Navy’s officer corps. While unsigned and ghostwritten articles
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were just on the right side of regulations regarding advocacy, Fiske’s involvement
with legislators crossed a bright line. For example, Theodore Roosevelt, although
a staunch navalist, was so incensed by naval officers lobbying Congress over legislation in the early 1900s that he threatened to court-martial any officer caught
doing so.71 Secretary Meyer went a step further, adding article 1517 to the Navy
regulations, barring naval officers from contacting representatives and senators
without going through Navy Department channels. It specifically directed them
to “refrain from any attempts to . . . form proposed bills.” While Daniels tended to
take a laissez-faire approach to the strict letter of article 1517, Fiske undoubtedly
knew that his behavior was beyond the pale.72
Nevertheless, Fiske persisted in his campaign. At the end of the year, he convinced former naval officer Representative Richmond P. Hobson, a Democrat
from Alabama, to invite him to testify in front of the House Naval Affairs Committee.73 Fiske also planted questions with Massachusetts Republican representative Ernest W. Roberts.74 As one historian noted, with some understatement,
Fiske’s gambit of arranging for himself to testify before Congress “bordered on
insubordination” and ran contrary to long-established practice regarding the testimony of serving officers.75
In front of the committee on 17 December, Fiske gave blistering testimony,
contradicting Daniels’s assurance to Congress that the Navy was prepared for any
eventuality. Fiske publicly aired the criticisms of administration policy he had
been making for some time, including issues with manpower, fleet size, and naval
administration. His biggest salvo (in response to a possibly planted question from
Roberts) was that the Navy was five years away from being able to fight a war. As
one might imagine, Fiske’s testimony was the final straw in the worsening relationship between the admiral and the secretary. From that point, Daniels “took
Fiske’s testimony as a justification for overlooking him henceforth.”76
Fiske’s allegations and charges caused a minor media sensation, with antiadministration and pro-preparedness organs using his testimony as a cudgel against the
government. In The Navy, a Navy League–aligned journal opposed to Daniels, an
editorial claimed that “[t]he country owes [Fiske] a debt of gratitude. . . . [I]t can
only be that he is remaining on this duty out of a sense of obligation to the service.” It went on to criticize the administration and Congress for failing to build a
“properly proportioned program providing the needed units,” including scouts and
battle cruisers.77 Even ex-secretary Meyer weighed in, with an early February piece
in the North American Review attacking the policies of his successor and calling for
a naval general staff.78
The 1914 hearings also fanned the flames of invasion scares, which peaked the
following year. Even before Fiske’s testimony, Harper’s Weekly published a piece
by ex–War Secretary Henry Stimson alleging that “an unknown enemy could
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seize New London, Connecticut, and move south.”79 In February, the New York
World suggested that the Atlantic Fleet should make a mock attack on New York
to highlight the nation’s unpreparedness.80 Fiske later pointed to this article as an
influence on his plans for the 1915 exercises.81
Taking advantage of this surge of favorable press, Fiske went even further,
crossing the line into outright rebellion against the secretary. Frustrated with
Daniels’s unwillingness to countenance organizational changes, Fiske and six
other officers met at Representative Hobson’s house on the night of 3 January and
drafted a bill that would, if passed, create a general staff led by a strong Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO).82 Hobson quickly took the bill to Congress, where a
subcommittee of the House Naval Affairs Committee unanimously advanced it.83
If Fiske’s autobiography is to be believed, this plotting occurred with the tacit
support of Admiral Dewey. In support of his claim, his band of conspirators practically constituted a committee of the General Board. Three—Captains Harry
Knapp, John Hood, and James Oliver—were themselves General Board members. The other three—Lieutenant Commanders Dudley Knox, William Cronan,
and Zachariah Madison—were assigned to the Navy Department in Washington.
Knox worked under Oliver in the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), while Cronan and Madison worked on war plans under Fiske.84 Further, prior to joining
ONI, Knox had worked with Captain William S. Sims at the Naval War College
and in the Atlantic Torpedo Flotilla, helping him apply College methods to the
development of tactical doctrine in the fleet.85
Luckily for Fiske’s cabal, it appears that Daniels was unaware of just how involved his advisers were in drafting the bill, although he surely would have seen
the aide’s hand in the bill’s provisions.86 Dirk Bönker has described Fiske’s goal
as remaking American “naval politics and institutions in an idealized Germanic
image,” and the original CNO proposal was his masterpiece.87 Under Fiske’s plan,
“the General Board, the Naval War College, and even the bureau chiefs would
lose power,” to say nothing of the secretary.88 Using his prodigious political gifts,
Daniels was able to water the bill down in the Senate, with the help of three bureau chiefs. The final bill kept the CNO position but removed management from
his portfolio, as well as stripping his authority over the bureaus.89
Naturally, Fiske viewed himself as the ideal choice for the new billet but was
aware that Daniels never would select him. Instead, the secretary—rightly convinced that much of the Navy’s leadership was hostile to him—tapped Captain
William Shepherd Benson, another southerner and the commandant of the Philadelphia Navy Yard, to be the first CNO, bypassing the Navy’s twenty-six rear
admirals.90 Although Fiske had no real need to resign from a post made redundant, he nonetheless presented his resignation—because of, he claimed, Daniels’s
interference and disrespect.91
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Fiske spent the final year of his career marooned as a supernumerary at the
Naval War College, but before moving to Newport he left a parting gift for Daniels in the form of the 1915 Atlantic Fleet exercises, which he was able to shape
substantially before departing.92 According to Fiske, his original idea was to
“show what would really happen if a hostile [German] fleet should start for our
eastern coast. . . . [I]t would not be a game at all, but a one-sided slaughter.”93 By
purporting to demonstrate what would happen if his warnings were not heeded,
Fiske hoped to change the government’s policy through a war game “educational
to the people.”94
THE U.S. NAVY OBSERVES WORLD WAR I
Before we turn to the exercises themselves, it is critical to understand naval
developments in the United States and abroad in 1914 and early 1915. Although
the United States was not a belligerent, the members of the U.S. Navy’s officer
corps paid rapt attention to the naval component of the First World War and
judged their own service against those observations, and what many of them
saw cast it in a bad light. However, rather than adopting German or British
practices in toto, their solutions to the perceived deficiencies of the U.S. Navy
were, unsurprisingly, tempered by their existing appreciation of its strategic and
operational contexts.
The early course of the war gave a boost to those officers concerned about the
U.S. Navy’s cruiser force. Although accurate and detailed information from the
belligerent powers was hard to come by, the war at sea clearly failed to match the
prewar assumptions of naval officers on both sides of the Atlantic, who expected another Trafalgar or Tsushima. Instead, the British and German battleships
mostly sat in Scapa Flow and Wilhelmshaven, respectively, while other classes of
warship took the lead. The naval war began with the chase of the German battle
cruiser Goeben and light cruiser Breslau in the Mediterranean and the cruiserdominated battle of Heligoland Bight in the North Sea, and cruisers continued to
play a dominant role in the naval war through the first year of the war.
Two events in December 1914 proved especially instructive. The first, the
battle of the Falkland Islands, demonstrated the power of battle cruisers against
armored cruisers. The battle pitted the German navy’s East Asia Squadron, composed at the time of two armored cruisers and three light cruisers, against a hastily organized British squadron centered on two battle cruisers, Invincible and Inflexible. The German force left the western Pacific in a desperate attempt to reach
home. It defeated a squadron of older British cruisers at the battle of Coronel off
the coast of Chile in early November. Having rounded the tip of South America,
the German commander, Vice Admiral Maximilian von Spee, attempted to attack
the British port of Stanley in the Falklands on 8 December. Unbeknownst to him,
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the British squadron had arrived the previous day; it proceeded to give chase and
destroyed the German squadron, while sustaining minimal casualties.95
Eight days later, German battle cruisers shelled the towns of Hartlepool, Scarborough, and Whitby in northeast England, causing little military damage but
killing more than a hundred Britons, mostly civilians. British intelligence had
given advance notice of the sortie, although not its destination, and Britain’s
entire Grand Fleet steamed to catch the raiders on their way back to Germany.
However, poor visibility, confused communications, and a convoluted chain of
command allowed the German ships to make a narrow escape.96 These events
made an impression in the United States and contributed to unfounded fears of
invasion and attack. The next day, the New York Times ran a slew of articles on
the attacks, including one that claimed ominously that Whitby and Scarborough
“are as open to the enemy as is Atlantic City.”97 Like other lurid predictions of
invasion or attack, this one failed to note why any hostile power would undertake
a transatlantic crossing to attack New Jersey.
Nevertheless, among naval officers and navalists these engagements reinforced
the concerns raised at the College about the Navy’s lack of scouts and battle cruisers. At the Falklands, Spee’s armored cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau—roughly
comparable to the U.S. Navy’s newest (though hardly new) Tennessee-class cruisers—were no match for two ships of the Invincible class, the Royal Navy’s oldest
and weakest battle cruisers. Likewise, the American fleet possessed no ships that
could hope to catch a battle cruiser raid on the coast, coming or going.
Judged solely on the basis of battleships, the United States was the world’s third
naval power, behind only Britain and Germany, but construction of battleships
and destroyers to the exclusion of cruisers over the previous decade had left the
U.S. Navy with an unbalanced fleet. Britain, Germany, and Japan all possessed
battle cruisers, while the U.S. Navy had none. Both the British and Japanese navies had more armored cruisers than the U.S. Navy. In light cruisers, the disparity was even more pronounced. A table drawn up for Congress comparing the
U.S. Navy against the prewar strength of the Great War’s combatants showed the
United States with fourteen light cruisers as compared with thirteen Japanese,
thirty-one German, and seventy-four British. On the U.S. side, only three of the
cruisers had been built since the turn of the century, as opposed to ten of the Japanese ships.98 The disparities with the Japanese navy were especially problematic,
suggesting that the American advantage in battleships disguised a lack of overall
combat effectiveness against a potential enemy with a smaller battle fleet.99
Many American officers recognized these weaknesses. In London, Commander Powers Symington, a naval attaché, wrote the director of ONI on the subject of cruisers soon after the battle of the Falklands. Symington, who had supported battle cruiser construction during his time at the College’s 1910 Summer
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Conference, insisted that the U.S. Navy was generally “very weak in not having
any fast light cruisers,” and at a disadvantage against Japan in the Pacific because
of the threat the four Japanese battle cruisers represented against American lines
of communication.100
The General Board expressed similar concerns. Even before the Falklands action and the German battle cruiser raids, it had warned that “the fleet is very seriously lacking in vessels of the cruiser and scout classes that could do effective
work in war,” forcing the Navy to keep superannuated nineteenth-century relics
such as the cruisers Cincinnati and Raleigh (both completed in 1894) in service.
While these ships, which were slower than the newest battleships, “should under
ordinary circumstances be relieved from active service,” they remained “a very
considerable percentage of such few vessels as we do have of even the approximate
speed and qualities that would make them valuable for scout and cruiser work.”101
The Atlantic Fleet’s winter exercises in early 1915 fed these concerns. In January, the fleet conducted three short war games on its way to winter quarters in the
Caribbean. All three scenarios divided the fleet into “red” and “blue” squadrons,
and a major part of their intent was to work on effective scouting and screening
techniques. To make up for its lack of cruisers, the fleet’s destroyers were pressed
into service as scouts.102 These ships, designed to protect the battle fleet from
torpedo attacks and to launch torpedo attacks of their own, had neither the seakeeping qualities nor the endurance for successful use as scouts. Using them as
such did not improve greatly the scouting picture and stripped vital protection
from the battle line. According to the fleet’s commander, Rear Admiral Fletcher,
in the moderate seas encountered during the exercises the fleet’s destroyers “were
forced to slow to fifteen and then to ten knots.” This was far too slow for effective
scout work.103
Indeed, “due to the absence of heavy scouts,” the superior Blue fleet “lost” the
first of the Atlantic Fleet’s exercises. This outcome, according to Fletcher, highlighted the need for specialized heavy scouts: “Without these scouts our battle
fleet will be unable to bring to action an inferior enemy fleet or to evade a superior
one. . . . Fast powerful scouts . . . are essential to utilize the power of battleships.”104
To be clear, Fletcher was not necessarily calling here for battle cruiser scouts,
merely for larger and more robust cruisers than the Navy’s existing scouts, to say
nothing of its destroyers.
Sims, commanding the Atlantic Fleet’s destroyers, pointed out the absurdity of
the fleet’s predicament in a letter to Fiske after the exercises.
The experience on the way down . . . has convinced a good many people that the
successful screening of a battleship force could not be accomplished without vessels
large enough to maintain their speed in a seaway, having heavy enough guns to drive
off the enemy’s cruisers, and heavy enough armor to resist their gun fire. In other
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words, there seems to be a majority of opinion that of two fleets the one having a
certain number of battle cruisers to support their screen would enjoy a tremendous
advantage.105

Two days later, Sims officially relayed his thoughts in a memorandum to the
General Board, again urging battle cruisers as a solution to the Navy’s scouting
woes.106 An editorial in The Navy (no doubt using information provided by sympathetic officers) took a similar lesson from the January exercises, noting that
a previous attempt to scout with destroyers had resulted in vessels “nearly lost,
reaching port battered by the seas and severely damaged, while a number had to
run for Bermuda.” In short, the U.S. Navy was “a fleet lacking scouts that can keep
the sea in all weather.”107
Late in January, asked by Daniels to comment on the charges from Fiske’s December 1914 testimony, Fletcher took the latter’s side. In a radio message to the
secretary, Fletcher predicted that “[i]t will require at least five years to provide
the necessary scouts . . . to effectively utilize the present battleship strength.”108
In August, Fletcher elaborated on the lessons of the winter exercises: “Our fleet
lacked the fast cruisers that are necessary to give information of the position of
the enemy as well as to deny the enemy information of our position and to screen
our own forces. . . . The winter’s work has made it evident that destroyers are quite
unsuited for scouting except under very favorable circumstances. . . . Destroyers
in no sense can be relied upon to take up the duties of fast cruisers.”109
There is little to suggest that these concerns from the fleet swayed Daniels;
Fletcher’s implicit endorsement of Fiske’s testimony probably did not help his
cause with the secretary. In the face of brickbats from the preparedness movement and concern from within the Navy, Daniels continued to insist that the
service was perfectly ready for war, should it come. In his annual report to Congress dated late 1914, he lauded the Navy’s role in the occupation of Veracruz
under the heading “Proof of the Preparedness of the Navy”—a surely deliberate
misinterpretation of “preparedness.”110 As Daniels well knew, critics of Wilson
administration defense policy were concerned about the military’s ability to fight
with or against one of the Great War’s belligerents, not questionable constabulary
operations in the Americas.
In 1914, in preparation for the 1915 Navy bill, Daniels declined to follow
the General Board’s recommendation for new construction. It urged a focus on
construction of cruisers, terming them ships of “great use . . . for scouting and
screening” that were “markedly lacking” in the Navy. Altogether, the board called
for a program of sixteen destroyers, nineteen submarines, four scout cruisers,
four battleships, and assorted auxiliaries and gunboats.111 From this list, Daniels
submitted a program to Congress consisting of two battleships, six destroyers,
eight submarines, an oiler, and a gunboat.112 That was still too much for President
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Wilson. According to Daniels’s diary, the president expressed a desire to cut the
program to one battleship at a 22 January 1915 cabinet meeting.113
DEFEAT BY DESIGN
By early 1915, then, all the elements were in place for Fiske to make a splash on
his way out of Washington. The outbreak of war in the summer of 1914 gave military affairs greater political salience, as shown by the preparedness movement,
which Fiske already had exploited with strategic leaks to the press and Congress. Likewise, there existed a marked disagreement between the secretary and
the Navy’s senior officers on the service’s fitness for war. Not only had Daniels
pointed to the Veracruz incident as proof of the fleet’s readiness, but he declined
to follow the General Board’s advice on the size and makeup of the construction
plan submitted to Congress in late 1914.
Finally, Fiske recognized that the Navy’s uniformed leadership was preoccupied with the vanishingly unlikely risk of a foreign advance into the Western
Hemisphere rather than an intervention in Europe. In February 1915, the Atlantic Fleet’s chief of staff, Captain Harry P. Huse, sounded the alarm about the
Allies or Central powers attacking American holdings and interests in the Caribbean, the location where “our next war will be fought, and [where] we could offer practically no defense.” Huse further warned, with great exaggeration, that a
European power could capture Cuba easily, in which case “our whole Atlantic and
Gulf seaboard would be exposed.”114 Likewise, the February 1915 Atlantic War
Portfolio, produced by Fiske’s small Operations staff and endorsed by the General
Board, assumed that the most likely enemy was Germany and the likeliest theater
of operations was the Caribbean.115
Therefore, when Fiske expressed a desire for “realistic” war games to Daniels in early February, he probably considered the highly improbable Germany
scenario to be a genuine test of the Navy’s capabilities against a likely threat.116
In his diary, Fiske indicated his desire to “show what would really happen if a
hostile fleet should start for our eastern coast.” To further his goals, Fiske convinced Daniels and a hesitant General Board to draw up the Atlantic Fleet’s May
exercises in Washington—“the modern and foreign method”—rather than letting
Fletcher plan his own. This, Fiske argued, would allow the exercises to help the
board refine its war plans. But Fiske also had political motives in mind; in a 24
February diary entry, he noted that the New York World had printed a “sensational suggestion for [a] sham attack on N. Y. by [the] Atlantic Fleet, using all the
ships in the Atlantic—125 in all!! To attempt this would expose our unpreparedness”—no doubt to the political advantage of Fiske’s friends in Congress.117
With permission secured, Fiske set about convincing the General Board to
write up plans for an invasion. Fiske was only partially successful. Daniels had
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approved the exercises with the caveat that the side representing the U.S. Navy
emerge victorious. The board, although in agreement with Fiske about the magnitude of the German threat, refused to allow an aggressor fleet of a similar size.
An exercise with an accurate German fleet would, most members of the board
argued, “not be a game at all, but a one-sided slaughter.” Fiske and the rest of the
board compromised on an aggressor fleet somewhat less than half the size of
the full German battle fleet.118 Interestingly, Assistant Secretary Roosevelt, who
attended the board meeting that finalized the plans, wanted to take the games a
step further. Desiring to create an “object lesson to the country,” Roosevelt, like
the New York World article from February, suggested that after the main exercises
concluded the Atlantic Fleet “could represent a Black [German] force pushing
home its attack on our coast,” highlighting the ostensible consequences of naval
unpreparedness.119
While the board declined to take up Roosevelt’s suggestion, the scenario as
written contained a tremendously inflammatory element: a German army. The
earliest draft of the exercise plan noted that the attacking fleet was carrying
twenty thousand soldiers, the advance guard for a further two hundred thousand
soldiers in the main invasion force.120 While the first wave of soldiers were nominally part of the exercises, in the form of transports that the German fleet needed
to protect, the second wave of two hundred thousand (later reduced to a hundred
thousand) played no role at all in the exercise—only serving to raise the stakes of
“defeat” for the Atlantic Fleet.121 Without belaboring the point, it should be noted
that the notion of sending 220,000, or even 120,000, soldiers across the Atlantic
to land on a hostile shore was utterly risible, and beyond the logistical capacity of
any military at the time.122
Despite Daniels’s clear instructions, the scenario devised by Fiske and the
General Board left little chance of an American victory. The exercise pitted ten
German dreadnoughts, four battle cruisers, eight predreadnoughts, thirty destroyers, “and a number of scouts,” along with transports carrying the vanguard
of an army, against an American fleet of six dreadnoughts (later increased to
seven), ten predreadnoughts, twenty-three destroyers, twelve submarines, and “a
number of inferior cruisers and merchant scouts.”123 Perhaps the board did not
intend for a “one-sided slaughter,” but there could be no doubt about the result of
such a lopsided balance of forces.
Even the orders for the invader suggested something of the framers’ preoccupations. In laying out the “General Situation” for the aggressor fleet’s commander,
Rear Admiral Frank Beatty, the board noted that the invasion was sent “[w]ith
full knowledge of Blue’s state of preparedness for war, and the consequent inability of Blue to mobilize quickly and efficiently its Naval and Military forces.”124
Given the prevailing political situation, this was a shocking—and, for the
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purposes of the exercise, entirely unnecessary—attack on government policy.
Critically, the imbalance between the two fleets
German
American
Type
(“Red”/“Black”)
(“Blue”)
was most severe in cruisers, as shown in table 2.
Dreadnoughts
10
7
The instructions identified the American cruisers
Predreadnoughts
8
10
by name; outside of the Navy’s four newest armored
Battle cruisers
4
0
cruisers and its three scouts, very few of these ships
Modern
4
6
were suited for modern warfare.
armored
cruisers
The five older cruisers included Chicago, comOlder
6
5
missioned in 1885, in use at the time as a training
cruisers
ship for state naval militiamen. The two protected
Civilian liners
0
4
cruisers, Tacoma and Des Moines, were overgrown
Scouts
20
2 + 1 as
a flotilla
gunboats and significantly slower than modern
leader
battleships, to say nothing of proper cruisers. Not
Modern
0
2
a single ship in the American order of battle could
protected
cruisers
keep pace with the German battle cruisers, boastSources: [General Board], “Red Situation”; [General Board], “Blue
ing top speeds of twenty-five knots or more, nor the
Situation.”
generally-as-fast scout cruisers.125
In a departure from the Atlantic Fleet’s winter exercises, this plan made extensive use of imaginary ships to represent elements of both fleets, including all the
scouting forces. Four ships represented the German battle fleet, one represented
its scouting line, and another the Blue (American) scouting line. The German
fleet and the single ship representing the Blue scouting line would steam together,
with the Blue scout sending periodic position updates on a schedule set by the
instructions.126 Whatever else happened, this protocol ensured that the Atlantic
Fleet could not use its exercises to practice scouting techniques with real ships.127
It ensured, too, that much of what followed would be governed by the assumptions about scouts and scouting held by senior Navy leadership.
The scenario’s details also blazed a path to the desired outcome. According to
the initial problem, the German fleet was steaming from the Azores (for reasons
unremarked on in the scenario), accompanied by the vanguard of an invasion
force. The game was to begin with the invaders approximately five hundred miles
off the American coast, bound for a location between Eastport, Maine, and Cape
Hatteras in North Carolina—comprising nearly half the eastern coastline, and
constituting a vast area for the defenders to cover.128 Rear Admiral Beatty, the
“German” commander, was under orders to steam for Cape Cod until encountering Blue units; after that, he was to turn south and make for the Virginia Capes at
the entrance to the Chesapeake.
Blue’s force started the exercise concentrated in Rhode Island’s Narragansett
Bay, under orders to “locate the Black fleet[,] . . . place his entire fighting force . . .

TABLE 2
EXERCISE FLEET APPORTIONMENT
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between the Black fleet and its objective, and bring Black fleet to battle near the
end of its voyage, and before it has reached its objective.”129 The last point was
critical. Under the terms of the problem, Fletcher could not attempt to attack the
German fleet at its most vulnerable position: after it reached its target but before
the landings were completed.
Contrary to Fiske’s earlier assertions to the secretary and the board, the exercise was not intended to help further the development of a war plan, or even to
allow the Atlantic Fleet to improve its tactical efficiency. Instead, it was designed
to “prove” a point on which the Navy’s leadership already agreed: the U.S. Navy
was not ready for a war with a great power. As Sims put it in a letter to Fiske
before the exercises, “[W]e will be able to get a good deal out of [the exercises]—
perhaps not a little in the way of things to be avoided next time.”130 By devising
such an incendiary scenario, Fiske and the board ensured that it would have the
maximum political impact.131
Still, the exercise scenario differed only slightly from the service’s own war
plans. Navy planners in the Atlantic Fleet, the General Board, and the Naval War
College had spent a great deal of time planning for a war with Germany. As we
have seen, those same planners assumed that the German fleet would escort a
large army across the Atlantic, and those who had spent time considering a war
with Germany were rather pessimistic about the odds of American victory. The
main difference was location; the plans assumed that any actual German landings
would occur in Latin America, not New England or the Middle Atlantic states.
The onset of the exercises was well reported in the national press, with a frontpage story in the New York Herald and articles in other major papers. The Washington Post even carried a piece, using an interview with Secretary Daniels, which
assured readers that the war game would “have a greater degree of realism than
such exercises in the past.”132 Also, it should be borne in mind that over a thousand passengers and crew, including 128 Americans, had been killed earlier that
month when the cruise liner RMS Lusitania was sunk by a German submarine,
inflaming American opinion against Germany and heightening attention on naval issues. Even President Wilson, no fan of martial displays, traveled to New
York to review the fleet before the exercise.133
The exercise itself, as intended, was anticlimactic, resulting in a resounding
“German” victory. According to the referee, Naval War College President Rear
Admiral Austin Knight, the Atlantic Fleet started off the exercise facing “the difficult problem of meeting an enemy force stronger than his own . . . and especially
stronger in scout’s [sic],” and could not overcome that disadvantage. Despite an
“excellent” scouting plan developed by Admiral Fletcher, “his smaller number of
slow scouts” ran into the opposing scouting line on the third day of the exercise
and were mauled, with “the most effective work against them being done by the
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enemy battlecruisers[,] whose high speed and long range guns enabled them to
pick off the slower and weaker . . . cruisers almost at will.”134
As a result, Fletcher’s force was blinded, and the “German” fleet “made its every
move with full knowledge of the enemy’s whereabouts.” While Fletcher withdrew
his fleet to cover potential landing sites in New England, Rear Admiral Beatty,
following his initial orders, made for the Chesapeake, well ahead of the Blue fleet.
After sending his transports ahead to the landing site, Beatty turned his battle fleet
northward toward the Atlantic Fleet. At this point, Knight stopped the exercise,
determining that the attacking fleet “was decidedly more powerful” than Blue’s
and “could, without difficulty, seize a base.”135 In his annual report Fletcher himself
blamed “the lack of heavily armored fast vessels and light cruisers” and the opponent’s “superior cruiser force” for the defeat. With such an imbalance in scouts, “the
enemy . . . was well informed of our movements and dispositions at all times.”136
The public-relations aftermath of the exercise went according to Fiske’s plan
as well. The New York Times reprinted Knight’s report on the exercise under the
headline “Battle Cruisers Won for ‘Invaders,’” musing that “[t]he lesson of the
war game, pointing to the need of fast and powerful scout cruisers . . . , will, it is
believed . . . , result in a recommendation that the coming Congress inaugurate
the policy of building battle cruisers.”137 The Washington Post went a step further,
noting the obvious similarities between the invaders and the German High Seas
Fleet and luridly claiming that the Atlantic Fleet was “adjudged incapable of protecting the United States from invasion by a foreign foe[,] . . . [who] was considered able to establish a base [and] march against Washington.”138
Supporters of naval expansion derived similar lessons. The Navy, of course,
claimed that the game showed “decisively that the navy of the United States is
lacking in battle cruisers.”139 Scientific American argued that the exercise provided
“an instructive lesson in the need for” scouts and battle cruisers.140 At the College,
Lieutenant Commander Harry Yarnell, a budding naval strategist, wrote soon
after the exercise that the U.S. Navy needed scouts with “speed and gun power
sufficient to overtake and destroy enemy vessels of the same class”—attributes
noticeably lacking in the 1915 fleet.141
Fiske, having resigned from the Aide for Operations post, took time to bask in
his success. While the war game was under way he took Assistant Secretary Roosevelt to lunch—and asked whether the latter was ready to take over at the Navy
Department in case Daniels was forced out.142 At the annual dinner of the Naval
Academy Graduates Association on 3 June, Fiske gave what he called “destructive
criticism”—in front of a crowd that included Daniels—laying out the supposed
dangers of a foreign invasion:
[A]n attack by one of the great naval powers is the only kind we need consider. . . .
[T]he attacking force would include battle cruisers, dreadnoughts, pre-dreadnoughts,
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scouts, cruisers, destroyers, . . . all fully manned and all strategically directed by a
General Staff.
What have we with which to oppose this force—a smaller number of dreadnoughts,
pre-dreadnoughts and destroyers than the enemy would bring; no battle cruisers, no
effective scouts. . . .
This means that, reasoning on the assumption that the United States desires that the
navy shall be able to guard our coast effectively against the only kind of attack that
would be made, the navy must obtain several types of vessels and instruments that we
do not now possess.143

In the speech, extracts of which were published on the front page of the New
York Times the next day, Fiske went on to urge members of the audience to make
the public understand the Navy’s alleged inadequacies, even in the face of official
censure and risk to their careers. He himself continued to agitate for naval expansion and a staff from his new perch in Newport, sparking another major confrontation with Daniels, with support from preparedness advocates in and out of office.144
The exercise also helped to increase pressure on President Wilson—already
under fire from the Lusitania sinking—to loosen the Navy’s purse strings. Outside the government, the Navy League agitated for a $500 million naval construction bill. Inside, men such as Assistant Secretary Roosevelt and Wilson’s closest
adviser, Edward House, urged the president to expand the military in the service
of preparedness.145 It is difficult to assign to the exercises a specific share of the
credit for the shifting political momentum, but they certainly gave ammunition
to the administration’s opponents.
Wilson, who earlier had tried to cut the 1915 program to one battleship, told
Daniels in July to prepare a large ship-construction program for the next fiscal
year.146 Armed with that knowledge, the General Board drafted a new naval policy, aiming to make the Navy “equal to the most powerful maintained by another
nation . . . not later than 1925.” At the same meeting, the board agreed tentatively
to place battle cruisers in their construction plan for the next year’s Navy bill.147
The sentiments expressed about the exercises certainly contributed to the
shape of the Navy’s final construction proposal. In October, Daniels clarified the
scope of the new program, asking the board to prepare a five-year, $500 million
program, echoing the Navy League’s calls for such a program in May.148 Two days
later, the board gave Daniels a program built around ten battleships, six battle
cruisers, and ten scouts.149
As the board related in November, this program had little to do with war
experience, instead resting on its assessment of the existing American fleet.
Noting that many American observers had been impressed by the performance of British battle cruisers in the war to date, the board took pains to make
the caveat that “the particular course of the present war does not justify the
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2021
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prevalent exaggerated idea of their importance.” Instead, the role of battle
cruisers was “chiefly . . . to secure information . . . and break through a hostile
screen” while protecting their own, not the roles demonstrated by the belligerents in the North Sea.150 This scouting rationale, however, matched exactly the
concerns expressed by Fiske, Sims, Fletcher, and others, as well as the preordained outcome of the summer 1915 war game.
While civilian officials have the final say on the specifics of the military’s budgetary requests and Congress authorizes acquisition programs and appropriates
their funding, military officers play a critical role in this system. Yet few politicians enter Congress with a working knowledge of the intricacies of military
policy, and frequently they defer to the judgment of uniformed professionals.
With their technical knowledge and experience, military officers often set the
bounds and terms of debate over providing for their services. Congress can
accept proposed budgets, cut them, or increase them, but very rarely do they
change the fundamental nature of the military’s requests for new acquisitions.
For example, Congress may not fund the number of attack submarines the Navy
wants in a given budget, or even kill the program entirely, but the legislature is
unlikely to force the service to build conventional submarines instead of the
nuclear submarines it desires.151
In the 1880s and 1890s, a relatively small group of naval officers convinced
leading civilian policy makers to fund a battleship navy, often in the face of opposition from other parts of the service. As this article shows, they may have
swung the pendulum of political opinion too far in favor of battleships. Viewed
in this context, for Fiske to take part in advocacy for the Navy was in keeping
with the recent history of American civil-military relations, although the means
he employed to intervene in political processes were wildly inappropriate. Still,
his campaign of dissent and underhanded politicking must be judged a partial
success. He did not create dissatisfaction with the Wilson administration or lead
the preparedness movement, but he skillfully turned critics of the administration
toward supporting his desired program for the U.S. Navy. Wilson’s about-face on
naval appropriations cannot be traced to Fiske alone, but his actions—influenced
by and coordinated with Wilson’s political adversaries—clearly played a role in
creating the domestic climate for a large Navy construction program. Furthermore, the nature of Fiske’s actions primed the pump for a construction program
incorporating more scouts than battleships.
Standard accounts of the 1916 Navy act’s genesis, even those written from a
naval history perspective, often have overlooked the active role that Fiske played
(and the General Board’s more passive role) in helping to create the preconditions for its framing and passage.152 Let us be clear about what happened. Led
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by Fiske, the members of the Navy’s uniformed leadership conspired to undermine the stated policy of their political masters, stopping only when the
administration agreed to pursue a large construction program (although Fiske,
especially agitated by Daniels, carried on for some time afterward).
The May 1915 exercise was a critical part of this strategy. As the evidentiary record makes clear, its framers were well aware of the effect an “invasion” of
the United States would have on domestic opinion. Likewise, they were aware
that Secretary Daniels had demanded that the exercise show proof that the Navy
could defend the Eastern Seaboard from attack. Instead, the scenario the General
Board wrote made success for the “American” side in the war game a near impossibility. This outcome was then spun as the inevitable failure of an unbalanced
fleet, as in (ex officio board member) Knight’s report on the game, which ended
up substantially reprinted in the press.
The nature of the Atlantic Fleet’s failure was critical to Fiske’s project. The scenario did not just guarantee American defeat; it guaranteed defeat as a result of
inadequate scouting capability. As theoretical work from the College and the Atlantic Fleet’s exercises earlier that year had demonstrated, major elements of the
Navy’s planning components were concerned about the U.S. Navy’s paucity of
scouts compared with its ostensible peer competitors. The summer exercise scenario broadcast as widely as possible—and more forcefully than the board’s construction memorandums—that the Navy’s leadership wanted new cruisers as soon
as possible.
At the same time, none of this should imply that war games or exercises with
overdetermined outcomes are somehow rare. Readers may remember U.S. Joint
Forces Command’s “Millennium Challenge 2002,” which was dogged by allegations that the game was rigged to validate “transformationalist” military stratagems.153 More benignly, framers of war games are forced to make any number of
assumptions about the capabilities of untested weapons, an unknown enemy’s
order of battle, and the like, which can have major effects on the course of an
exercise or chart maneuver.154
Even the political effects sought by Fiske and the General Board have had
echoes in other exercises. Ex–Secretary of the Navy John Lehman recently wrote
that the Navy’s exercises in near-Soviet waters during the 1980s were intended to
reassure allies and affect Soviet estimates of the balance of naval power.155 Likewise, the Soviet Navy’s OKEAN exercises in the 1970s were designed to impress
observers with the global reach of conventional Soviet power.156 Contemporary
American exercises with foreign militaries are designed with diplomatic and signaling objectives in mind, alongside testing operational efficacy.
What makes Fiske’s exercise unique is that the desired political effect and
predetermined result were intended to embarrass the administration he served
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and, perhaps, spark the removal of Daniels as Secretary of the Navy.157 Fiske was
only partially successful with this risky enterprise, and then only because his
objectives reflected a settled consensus on strategy and judgment of the Wilson
administration’s policies in critical nodes of naval leadership, including the General Board, the Naval War College, and the Atlantic Fleet.158 Even after his ouster, the General Board drafted and justified the 1916 bill using language similar
to Fiske’s. When asked to defend their recommendations in Congress, General
Board members did not treat the battle cruisers and scout cruisers as supernumerary add-ons, but “special ship[s] for special duties,” critical for conducting
modern naval warfare. Even after the Battle of Jutland in May and June of 1916
threw the future of the battle cruiser type into doubt, American officers continued to insist, truthfully, that their ships were intended for a different mission, and
that British and German practices and outcomes were inappropriate evidence on
which to judge American plans.159
One of Fiske’s biographers has stated, rather generously, that he “at times . . .
allowed his blue-and-gold professionalism to place him at variance with accepted
precepts of civil-military relations in a democracy.”160 This flaw was shared by
many naval officers of the early twentieth century. As members of the American
elite, they felt themselves free to engage with members of their stratum of society,
including newspapermen and politicians. The Navy League—firmly embedded
in the political, social, and financial elite of the coastal regions—was created in
part because President Roosevelt had threatened to court-martial any officer who
lobbied Congress directly.161
Even against that background, Fiske’s behavior stands out for its audacity. Any
flag officer seeking to follow his path today would be relieved of command and
court-martialed, and rightly so. Even though he was not the only naval officer of
the period willing to ghostwrite newspaper columns and advise congressmen and
senators on policy under the table, he was the only one willing to write controversial legislation in a congressman’s sitting room. Even so, Fiske only felt comfortable designing the exercises when he knew his career was effectively over. More
research is needed to state this conclusively, but 1915 may be the only time in
American history that a senior military officer designed an exercise for the express purpose of embarrassing a sitting administration.
We also should not ignore the role that personal animus played in these events.
Naval officers of the day tended to have a generalized disdain for politicians, but
many of the officers discussed here appear to have had a thoroughly personal
contempt for Daniels specifically. It is difficult not to see this as a motivating factor in Fiske’s actions. His autobiography, published in 1919 while Daniels was still
in office, drips with hatred for the secretary. Beyond Fiske’s individual feelings,
many of the actions of other officers discussed in this article—from the other six
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conspirators who met at Representative Hobson’s house to officers at the College
asking the secretary to cede some of his power—hardly suggest respect for the
man or his position.162
Most naval historians, this author included, would argue that Fiske and his
supporters had a more realistic understanding of the Navy’s operational shortcomings than did Daniels; their fixation on the virtually nonexistent threat of
a German invasion in the Western Hemisphere is a different story. That said,
Daniels was not a naval, but a political, professional. Fiske’s forays into Daniels’s
arena were amateurish; his hope that he could induce Wilson to fire a member of
his cabinet over caterwauling from the opposition or a failed exercise was absurd.
Yet even though Fiske was only partially successful, that should not blind us
to how wildly inappropriate his political machinations were, almost from the
beginning of Daniels’s installation as secretary. Fiske’s activities violated a host
of regulations and civil-military norms. Any contemporary officer following his
lead would be lucky indeed if he only ended up waiting for retirement in a deadend assignment.
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